The United Nations’ (UN) decision to adopt international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS). by Chow,  D & Pontoppidan,  C.A.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
01 May 2019
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Chow, D and Pontoppidan, C.A. (2019) 'The United Nations' (UN) decision to adopt international public
sector accounting standards (IPSAS).', Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting Financial Management, 31
(2). pp. 285-306.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-08-2018-0087
Publisher's copyright statement:
This article is c© Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here
http://dro.dur.ac.uk/28061. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or
hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 
DURHAM REPOSITORY VERSION (28 March 2019) 
 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM’S DECISION TO ADOPT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
SECTOR ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (IPSAS) 
 
 
AUTHORS 
Danny Chow 
Durham University Business School 
Mill Hill Lane 
Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom 
Email: dannychow@me.com 
 
 
Caroline Aggestam Pontoppidan  
Copenhagen Business School 
Department of Accounting and Auditing,  
Solbjerg Plads 3, Frederiksberg 2000, Denmark 
Email: cap.acc@cbs.dk 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We would like to thank seminar participants at the Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
conference held at the Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada (July, 2014) 
and at the New Public Sector seminar held at the University of Edinburgh (November, 
2015). We would also like to extend our thanks to Jim Haslam for comments on an earlier 
draft of the paper. The authors would also like to thank their respective departments 
(Durham University Business School and Copenhagen Business School) for internal 
funding that facilitated the development of this paper. Finally, our paper has also 
tremendously benefited from the two reviewers’ constructive comments.  
 
Declaration: 
One of the authors of this paper has worked with the UN in an advisory capacity on their 
accounting standards development and interpretation function.  All documentary sources 
used are publicly available, however. 
 
 
  
The UN System’s decision to adopt IPSAS 
 1 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM’S DECISION TO ADOPT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
SECTOR ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (IPSAS) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: The objective of this study is to analyse and understand the UN System’s 
adoption of IPSAS from a legitimacy perspective. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: A content analysis of publicly accessible documents 
from the UN System archives was conducted. The analysis was framed through the 
broader lens of legitimacy theory, drawing attention to the rationalities of decisions taken. 
 
Findings: This study illustrated how the need for accounting reforms was rationalised 
throughout the UN System of organisations. Decision-making processes were reflective of 
political concerns and the accompanying need to continually demonstrate accountability. 
The discursive strategies observed associated the need to improve accountability with the 
adoption of globally recognised accounting systems. However, such logic assumed that 
existing accountability deficits were intrinsically linked to accounting failures, which 
overemphasises accounting’s role.  
 
Originality/value: This study addresses a lacuna in empirical studies providing an 
understanding of the role of accounting reforms within international organisations such as 
the UN System. 
 
Social implications: The UN System’s decision to adopt IPSAS in 2006 has been followed 
by a substantial increase in the number of Member States following suit. However, 
governments and other organizations considering IPSAS adoption should be aware of the 
historical context in which the UN System’s decision was made. 
 
Keywords: IPSAS, public sector accounting, reforms, legitimation, United Nations 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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“IPSAS furthermore is the only globally accepted standard and there is a global reform 
trend towards IPSAS” (Mr A. Makaronidis, Head of Eurostat, 2017, p.157). 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The quote above from a senior European Union (EU) civil servant highlights the growing 
influence of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS; A full table of all 
acronyms used is provided at the end of the paper) as an accounting-based reform 
programme for governments and international bodies worldwide. IPSAS is fast becoming 
the benchmark standard for reformers keen to see international harmonisation of public 
sector accounting standards. However, the standing or legitimacy of any accounting 
standard that claims global appeal is often contested, as can be seen by the fact that a 
number of leading reformist countries have chosen to develop their own competing 
systems. An example in this regard includes the United States (US) government, which 
does not use IPSAS at all, while the EU is developing an amended version called 
European Public Sector Accounting Standards or EPSAS for short (Heald and Hodges, 
2015; Aggestam-Pontoppidan and Brusca, 2016).  
 
The year 2005 heralded a significant turning point, as the United Nations Organisation 
(UNO) as a standalone institution and the wider UN System of interlinked organisations 
(e.g., the World Food Programme (WFP)) decided to adopt IPSAS. This move was seen as 
“a logical next step” (UN, 2005c, para.5) as the existing standard (United Nations System 
of Accounts or UNSAS) was no longer “considered to meet the needs of modern financial 
reporting” (ibid.). It was also the first time the UN System adopted an international 
accounting standard rather than allowing individual organisations within the UN System to 
develop their own systems. The move to IPSAS was said to reflect the UN System’s stated 
aim to “achieve consistent, high quality financial reporting across the System” (ibid.).  
 
The UN System’s pre-eminent global leadership role means that the policies it adopts are 
often subsequently promoted and diffused to its Member States. Indeed, due to its 
extensive membership of more than 190 nation states, the UN System’s decision can be 
seen as conferring significant legitimacy and prestige on IPSAS. Whilst at the time of 
writing only some countries (Switzerland and several smaller states, see Bergmann and 
Fuchs, 2017, p.28 and IFAC-CIPFA, 2018) have moved to IPSAS, a number of notable 
International Organisations (IOs) such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), International Criminal 
Police Organisation (Interpol) and the European Commission (EC) have adopted IPSAS 
prior to the UN System. Nevertheless, the UN System’s embrace still represents a 
seemingly progressive and influential move by what is arguably the most prominent 
global institution. 
 
Richardson and Eberlein (2011) suggested that once accounting standards reach a certain 
level of ‘global authority’ (p.221), normative pressures for other jurisdictions to follow suit 
increases. This was exemplified when other IOs (such as the World Bank and the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF)) mandated the adoption of recognised international 
accounting standards as a condition of their involvement with certain countries (e.g., Neu 
et al., 2006; Neu and Ocampo, 2007). Such developments suggest that it is important to 
understand the UN System’s adoption of IPSAS given its status as an IO accountable for 
the decisions it takes to all of its Member States. Given its longstanding presence as an IO, 
the lack of substantive research coverage on important UN decisions regarding its 
financial reporting mechanisms is surprising (Bergmann and Fuchs, 2017). This study goes 
some way to address this gap by developing a historical narrative of the decision-making 
process by drawing on a content analysis of publicly available documents from the UN 
and other archives. The rationalities that underpinned the decisions leading to IPSAS’ 
adoption were analysed by framing them through the lens of discursive strategies for 
legitimation developed by Vaara, Tienari and Laurila (2006).  
 
While there is some emergent literature on the adoption of IPSAS at the WFP (Alesani, 
Jensen and Steccolini, 2012) and in academic discussions of the complexities faced by the 
UN System in its adoption of IPSAS (Bergmann, 2010; Bergmann and Fuchs, 2017), there 
is limited research that analyses the role of accounting reforms within the UN System, with 
Rahman (1998) being the notable exception. This study will contribute to the emergent, 
and hence still limited, literature from a legitimacy perspective, as well as extend 
knowledge on how supranational organisations operate to promote and diffuse 
accounting practices (Neu et al., 2006; Neu and Ocampo, 2007).  
 
In brief, the study has been developed as follows: Section 2 reviews the extant literature 
on legitimacy and public sector accounting reforms. Section 3 develops an exposition of 
the theoretical framing used for the analysis, and section 4 details the data and methods 
used. In the analysis that follows, section 5 explores the initial process by which the UN 
System established its internally developed accounting systems. This latter section also 
considers the impact of the oil-for-food scandal on subsequent accounting developments. 
Section 6 examines the re-establishment of an externally developed accounting standard 
in the form of IPSAS. The final section discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This review first considered the literature documenting the UN System’s role in the 
development of other IOs adopting various global accounting standards, before 
reflecting on the wider body of literature dealing with the rationalities for accounting 
reforms. While this paper’s principal focus is on the decision within the UN System to 
adopt IPSAS, the role of the UN System as a global pioneer of accounting standards is 
also considered in this literature review.  
 
2.1 UN involvement in international accounting standards 
The UN System has historically positioned itself as an advocate for the standardisation of 
financial reporting practices worldwide. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UN 
System was given its first international standard-setting role to deal with the growing 
power of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the impact that these organisations have 
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on the economic affairs of many countries (Gray, Shaw and McSweeney, 1981), especially 
developing nations (Rahman, 1998). Many governments and trade unions responded, 
calling for improved levels of accountability and transparency over capital flows from 
TNCs (Rahman, 1998; Aggestam-Pontoppidan, 2005).  
 
The OECD and the UN System both developed new accounting frameworks to regulate 
the financial conduct of these corporations. This was seen as necessary from a legitimacy 
standpoint to counter the perception that TNCs wielded unduly large influence on 
accounting standard-setting and appeared unaccountable with regard to their activities 
within the developing countries they operate in (Rahman, 1998). In 1976, the OECD 
published its guidelines on TNCs and in 1977, the UN Intergovernmental Working Group 
of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (or simply the Working 
Group) published its ‘International Standards of Accounting and Reporting for 
Transnational Corporations’.  
 
In parallel with developments at the UN System, the 1970s and 1980s also heralded the 
formation of a number of independent global accounting institutions. The International 
Accounting Standards Committee or IASC (today International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB)) was founded in 1973 as the first global accounting standard-setting body 
and it was primarily designed to promote Anglo-American perspectives on accounting 
(Hopwood, 1994). The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, founded in 1977) 
established the Public Sector Committee or PSC (the precursor to the IPSAS Board 
(IPSASB)) in June 1986 to deal specifically with government accounting issues. The first 
meeting of the PSC was held in January 1987 in London, where its role was defined as 
“developing accounting and auditing standards and promoting their voluntary 
acceptance” (Dye, 1988, p.17). The PSC received joint funding from the World Bank, IMF, 
Asian Development Bank, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), all of which 
expected their borrowers to use internationally recognised financial reporting standards 
(Humphrey and Loft, 2008).   
 
In debating the inter-linkages between accounting and legitimacy, the UN System’s 
primary focus was to develop the institutional capability to influence global financial 
reporting, a consequence of the many rival international bodies emerging at that time. 
These early deliberations on accounting harmonisation of the UN System’s ‘own’ 
accounting practices coincided with the establishment of the IASC. As Rahman (1998) 
pointed out, the UN System was seen as a (morally) legitimate body that represented the 
interests of developing (as well as rich) countries, whereas other emerging standard 
setters (e.g., IASC) were perceived as primarily serving the interests of wealthier and more 
capitalistic nations. It was not until approximately a decade later that the idea of 
coordinating international harmonisation for public sector accounting materialised. Both 
the UN System and IFAC’s PSC recognised that public sector accounting could (and 
should) be globally harmonised and there was a growing awareness that little published 
financial data existed for public sector entities as well as governmental organisations 
despite the substantive funds they held and managed (Dye, 1988; Rocher, 2010).   
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Nevertheless, despite the UN System’s early involvement in external standard-setting, 
there was never a need to demonstrate its own accountability to its constituencies 
through formal accounting mechanisms. For example, prior to 1973, financial reporting as 
a practice to promote (internal) accountability was largely non-existent within the UN 
System and scrutiny was only possible on the basis of published budgetary information. 
However, developments in the transnational arena of standard-setting sparked debate on 
the UN Systems’ own deficiencies in demonstrating accountability in order to secure its 
status as a credible participant in the global standard-setting project.   
 
2.2 Rationalities for accounting reforms 
Concurrently, the need for legitimacy and strategies of legitimation are also central 
themes that underpin the rationale for accounting reforms in the public sector (Ansari and 
Euske, 1987). Organisational changes driven by accounting-based reforms are not just 
triggered by economic rationales for improved decision-making, but also by crises of 
legitimacy that necessitate restitution (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). The remedy, so to 
speak, is often based on the rhetoric of rational accounting-based solutions to problems 
caused by organisational failures, particularly with respect to accountability.  
 
However, the reliance on accounting to resolve issues of accountability can suffer from the 
embedded thinking of reformers who themselves are often trained in accounting and/or 
have extensive experience with accounting-based reforms (Christensen and Parker, 2010; 
Hyndman et al., 2018) and struggle to think of (non-accounting) alternatives to the 
problems posed (Brunsson, 2006). For instance, it is not just opportunistic politicians or 
ambitious finance ministers, but also sophisticated users (Durocher and Gendron, 2011) 
who are taken in by the rhetoric of rationalising accounting change as a means to improve 
decision-making and accountability within organisations. This can lead to situations where 
important critical questions are not raised, such as the suitability of adopting global 
accounting standards for an individual country or organisation.  
 
Evidence of accounting reforms having resolved these organisational issues stemming 
from a lack of accountability is at best mixed. Bergmann and Fuchs (2017) as well as 
Moloney and Stoycheva (2018) found evidence that adopting international standards for 
IOs can bring some improvements in transparency. Both papers also found that standards 
adoption could prompt meaningful debates over existing financial reporting complexities. 
Bergmann and Fuchs (2017) noted the issues with IPSAS’ revenue recognition standards 
in their analysis of the way in which UN System organisations reported on voluntary 
contributions, while Moloney and Stoycheva (2018) found that financial reporting 
practices of IOs were, generally speaking, more transparent than their budgetary 
processes.  
 
However, in the context of government accounting reforms in the United Kingdom (UK), 
Connolly and Hyndman (2006) found that claims for the introduction of accruals 
accounting were overly optimistic as costs were obfuscated and users struggled to 
articulate the benefits of the reforms. Wall and Connolly (2016) concluded that the 
introduction of (modified) IFRS to the devolved UK governments (i.e., Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales) have had minimal impact on the decision-making processes of their 
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real-world users. Chow, Humphrey and Moll (2008) also found that reformers had 
retrospectively justified the implementation of consolidated ‘Whole of Government 
Accounting’ reforms on the grounds that it is useful for catalysing further accounting 
reforms in the UK public sector.   
 
Such disconnects between the user and the value of the reform can also be evidenced 
elsewhere. For example, Brusca, Montesinos and Chow (2013) found that when the 
Spanish central government adopted IPSAS and moved to an accruals-based accounting 
system, the information produced was of little use because Spanish politicians and civil 
servants were still largely making decisions on the basis of cash based budgets. 
Kobayashi, Yamamoto, and Ishikawa (2016) discovered that Japanese local government 
officials do not use accruals accounting in a dual (cash and accruals) reporting system, 
despite being able to articulate the hypothetical benefits of making decisions on the basis 
of accruals. A recent review of the literature on the usefulness of accruals accounting 
reforms in the public sector by van Helden (2016) also reveals a similar picture. An 
interpretation of these findings is that these disassociations are possible because 
decisions to proceed with reforms were made without a clear idea of how the reform 
principles are to be operationalised as the reforms are primarily about legitimising the 
actions of reformers.   
 
More generally, Humphrey, Miller and Scapens (1993) point to the congenitally failing 
nature of accounting-based reforms in real life to deal with accountability deficits. 
Humphrey et al.’s (1993) critique exposed the unyielding faith that reformers have in 
perceiving accounting reforms as a solution for problems caused by legitimacy 
deficiencies and/or weak management in the public sector. This is not only because 
recipients of such reforms are primarily attracted to the logical construction of reform 
principles (e.g., due to its characteristics such as inner consistency and clarity of 
argumentation; Brunsson, 2006, p.110), but also as a result of the ‘self-evident’ rationality 
of the reform principles (Lapsley, Mussari and Paulsson, 2009) that make it difficult for 
recipients (and others) to critique and resist (Brunsson, 2006, p.166).   
 
Lapsley et al. (2009) and Brunsson (2006) highlighted the seemingly unfounded yet taken-
for-granted assumptions that accounting reforms in the public sector constitute an 
obvious rational solution to organisational legitimacy issues, especially given the lack of 
substantive evidence demonstrating that such solutions work. The effects of such 
ingrained thinking also appear to dominate thought processes at IOs such as the World 
Bank. Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2007) illustrated the challenges faced to overcome this 
as organisations appear incapable of breaking away from the orthodoxy of accounting-
based solutions to problems caused by crises of political legitimacy involving issues such 
as corruption. Therefore, the seemingly dominant rationalisation of economic efficiency 
alone (in the form of improved decision-making from better quality accounting 
information) should not and cannot be the main or only reason for change (Ansari and 
Euske, 1987; Carpenter and Feroz, 1992).  
 
Undeniably political and economic crises often serve as catalysts for accounting-based 
organisational change. Chua and Taylor (2008, p.470) stated that it is important for 
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politicians to be seen to be making calls for accounting reforms, even when there are 
uncertainties over the economic efficacy of the solutions proffered. For instance, 
Carpenter and Feroz (1992) found no compelling evidence to suggest that New York 
State’s decision to adopt US Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (US GAAP) had led 
to significant changes and improvements in its financial management practices. Instead, 
the move to GAAP was simply seen as a way to shore up the state government’s political 
legitimacy subsequent to a period in which the state’s finances were badly managed. 
 
The various institutional (and non-economic) rationales for accounting-based change 
described here increase demand for outsourcing the development of accounting 
standards that confer universal or global legitimacy (Chua and Taylor, 2008). This demand 
creates opportunities for organisations with aspirations to develop accounting standards 
that are universally appealing. For example, the construction of global standards reflects 
the increasingly successful work of institutions with global reach such as IFAC and its 
public sector counterpart, IPSASB. IFAC’s success in building global financial 
infrastructure around business accounting and auditing can be attributed to the growing 
reliance on governance by experts (as opposed to governance by plebiscite) combined 
with the increasing reach of global accounting firms (Loft, Humphrey and Turley, 2006; 
Humphrey, Loft, and Woods, 2009). Similarly, the rise and spread of global regulatory 
standards for the public sector, such as IPSAS, also represent an important development 
in the recognition of such demands, mimicking some of the reasons for the rise of IFRS in 
the commercial sector. However, the widespread adoption of global accounting 
standards by IOs exerts powerful mimetic pressure on its constituent bodies and nations 
to similarly harmonise their standards and practices. Lehman (2005) for instance notes 
how such mimesis can have a negative impact on democratic accountability, as it is the 
(private sector) accounting profession that determines global standards, but nations that 
bear the cost of disruptive capital flows arising from the use of those standards. 
 
In synthesising the elements of the literature above, legitimacy appears to be a central 
motif for many accounting-based reforms in the public sector. Rational arguments based 
on economic efficiency are only one of many justifications used to legitimise the need for 
change despite their prominence. However, the extant literature is only beginning to 
develop an understanding of the role of accounting reforms such as IPSAS and issues of 
its suitability for IOs such as the UN System. Indeed, there is a perceptible lack of clarity 
regarding both the processes and rationale(s) impelling the processes in which new 
standards are adopted at IOs. In the next section, a framework based on Vaara et al.’s 
(2006) theory on discursive strategies used for legitimation is developed to analyse issues 
surrounding IPSAS. A section on the method and data used then follows this.  
 
 
3 DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES FOR LEGITIMATION  
 
Vaara et al. (2006) derived their model from Fairclough’s (1997) critical discourse analysis, 
synthesising key discursive strategies used to legitimate industrial restructuring in the 
media. Their model identifies a typology of five strategies: normalisation, authorisation, 
rationalisation, moralisation and narrativisation (Vaara et al., 2006, p.804). Normalisation 
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refers to legitimation by exemplarity or conformity. In the literature reviewed, the mimicry 
associated with a taken-for-granted (self-evident) acceptance (Lapsley et al., 2009) of 
global accounting standards (Everett et al. 2007; Durocher and Gendron, 2011) reflects 
the environmental conditioning of reformers who are generally professionally trained 
accountants with similar backgrounds and education (e.g., Christensen and Parker, 2010; 
Hyndman et al., 2018).  
 
Authorisation refers to legitimation through an authority or individual with sufficient 
expertise and/or the right to confer legitimacy. The use of IPSAS confers legitimacy as it is 
developed by an institution (IPSASB) with global authority to develop public sector 
accounting standards. IOs, pioneering countries (e.g., UK, Australia, and New Zealand) 
and global accounting firms (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers or PwC) also have similar 
abilities to confer authority, based on the significant expertise and/or experience with 
accounting reforms that they possess (Christensen, 2005; Neu et al., 2006; Christensen 
and Parker, 2010; Free, Radcliffe and White, 2013).   
 
Rationalisation refers to legitimation based on the logical construction of reform 
principles (Brunsson, 2006). Despite the logical basis, such rationalisations often have 
implicit (or even explicit) ideological underpinnings based on a neoliberal interpretation 
of economic ideas (Vaara et al., 2006; p.800; Christensen and Parker, 2010). Hopwood 
(1992, p.136) demonstrates how such ideology operates with the public sector in many 
countries often transformed in the name of rational principles of economic efficiency and 
value-for-money, but without precisely defining what these are. Hopwood also notes that 
it can be difficult to critique the adoption of rationalised reforms when nobody wants to 
be seen refusing reforms that purportedly enhance efficiency and value-for-money (ibid.). 
 
Moralisation refers to the use of specific values in justifying reforms and is closely linked to 
the use of ideology in rationalisation, such as economic rationality, and/or the interests 
(rights) of certain groups such as nationalistic and humanistic claims (Vaara et al., 2006). A 
crisis caused by corruption invokes the need for redemption through moralisation – to 
make right from wrong, as demonstrated by the decision to adopt GAAP standards by the 
Government of the State of New York (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992).  
 
Narrativisation refers to the use of mythical story telling (mythopoesis) to create a 
perception and environment of acceptable, appropriate or preferential behaviour. In 
particular, the use of dramatic narratives portrays individuals and/or organisations as 
heroes, victims or villains to help legitimise (or de-legitimise) certain actions or behaviour. 
Lapsley et al.’s (2009) depiction of the narrative that the expansion of accruals accounting 
reforms is due to self-evident solutions to problems of organisational legitimacy serves as 
an illustrative example of how continuity with accruals based reforms are not only rational, 
but also form part of the wider story around the progressive nature of reforms. According 
to Vaara et al., these strategies are not mutually exclusive but often ‘intertwine’ or are used 
in combination to legitimise, de-legitimise or re-legitimise discourses. For example, they 
argue, “while narrativization served as an important legitimating strategy in its own right, it 
often provided an overall frame that supported the other types of legitimation” (p.804).  
 
The UN System’s decision to adopt IPSAS 
 9 
 
4 METHOD AND DATA 
 
In this study, publicly accessible documents from the archives of UN System organisations 
and principal organs were reviewed. Official documents, such as minutes of meetings, 
decision and progress reports and recent policy papers, were collated. The scope of 
archival documents spanned the period from 1945 to 2016, but the most relevant 
documents are from a narrower range, namely 1979 to 2011. The final sample selected 
for analysis contained 58 publicly accessible documents such as UN reports, Joint 
Inspection Unit (JIU) reports, General Assembly Resolutions, the High-Level Committee on 
Management (HLCM) conclusions and various UN System progress reports. Biraud’s 
report for the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU, 2010) published a post-decision analysis on the 
original recommendations (UN 2005b; 2005c; 2006b) and preparedness of UN System 
organisations for IPSAS. The process of accumulating relevant documents continued until 
2016, as some of the post-decision documents have proven useful as a source of 
reflection, although due to space constraints, only documents cited in this study were 
referenced. The archive of documents also included those issued by non-UN actors, such 
as Congressional Research Service Reports (CRS) issued by the US government that 
address the accountability and/or accounting problems of the UN. As is indicated above, 
all sources cited are publicly accessible.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
To review UN resolutions (i.e., formally agreed decisions that will be put into action), an 
online database of the UN Advisory Committee on administrative and budgetary 
questions was used. The following keywords were employed for the search: Accounting, 
financial reporting, accountability, oil-for-food, UNSAS (UN System of Accounts) and 
IPSAS. A chronology of decisions that led to the decision that the UN System was to adopt 
IPSAS was constructed using content analysis (Malsch and Gendron, 2011), and key 
decisions are highlighted in Table 1. The content analysis allowed for the identification 
and mapping of the main actors as well as their interactions and interrelationships in the 
accounting reforms at the UN System. Figure 1 outlines the hierarchy of key UN 
organisations such as the HLCM and the Task Force on Accounting Standards (referred to 
simply as the ‘Task Force’ in this study). The HLCM, which is made up of senior 
administrative managers from the member organisations of the UN System, played a key 
role in authorising the reforms. The Task Force is an inter-agency group comprised of 
accountants from all UN System organisations (UN, 2005b) and which operates under the 
approval of the HLCM to facilitate and coordinate dialogue on accounting reform. Figure 
1 also shows the relationship between the principal organs and a selection of UN System 
organisations. The following two sections present the results of the analysis.  
 
 
5 LEGITIMATION AND DE-LEGITIMATION OF INTERNALLY DEVELOPED SYSTEMS  
 
5.1 Legitimising accounting reforms through normalisation and rationalisation 
The UN System’s decision to adopt IPSAS 
 10 
Prior to 1980, the UN System’s accounting and financial reporting practices were not 
based on any common set of standards. The UN System founded the Consultative 
Committee on Administrative Questions, Financial Budgets (CCAQ (FB)) in 1980, with the 
task to develop a single unified accounting system for all UN organisations, a move 
supported by the UN System’s external auditors (UN, 1979). The road towards 
establishing a standardised accounting practices across the UN System was further 
cleared when the CCAQ (FB) decided (in 1980) that recommendations from the IASC 
should form the basis of the UN System’s own development of its internal accounting 
system (UN, 1980). Shortly after these recommendations were issued, an agreement was 
made to reference the IASC’s work as a starting point for the UN System to develop its 
own standards (UN, 1980). In this regard, the IASC’s work served as a basis for 
legitimisation through a strategy of normalising the accounting change (e.g., Botzem and 
Quack, 2009) within the UN System.  
 
The use of normalisation as a discursive strategy was made clearer in 1981 when the 
CCAQ (FB) reiterated its recommendation for the adoption of accounting standards 
developed by bodies external to the UN and urged the organisations within the UN 
System “to follow the IASC standards as far as they were applicable in the UN System” 
(UN, 1981, para.21 (a)). This recommendation set out an expectation that the UN System’s 
development of its own (internal) accounting system should be based on international 
standards, which is in-keeping with its founding charter on the principles of global 
cooperation (UN, 1945). In this regard, the UN Charter (paragraphs 3 and 4) expected the 
UN System to act as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations to achieve common 
economic prosperity. In extending this rationalisation a step further, the UN System 
ultimately decided to set an example for global cooperation by itself adopting the 
international accounting standards it was advocating.  
 
The UN System was thus actively pursuing a reformist agenda aligned with commonly 
held accounting principles used in capital markets, such as the qualitative characteristics 
of going concern, consistency, prudence, substance over form, the disclosure of 
significant accounting policies, materiality, sincerity, periodicity and regularity (UN, 1981, 
para.21). A newly developed standard, the ‘inter-organizational accounting and financial 
reporting standard’ [sic] was issued, which mandated the disclosure of accounting 
policies used in UN System organisations and corresponded for the most part to 
International Accounting Standard No.1 (IAS 1, 1975 version; this standard was 
significantly revised in 1997).  
 
Despite the development of an internal standard based on IAS 1, however, the UN System 
retained full control over the standard-setting and implementation process. It used 
moralising arguments to legitimise this decision to deviate from full adoption, claiming 
that while it is obliged to adhere to global cooperation principles, it had to have 
autonomy over its own standards. This is due to its unique global standing as a world 
body with many diverse Member States to which it is directly accountable (UN, 1991b).  
 
However, shortly after this ‘inter-organizational’ accounting standard was issued, 
questions over its legitimacy were raised. In 1982, the chairperson of a meeting of Chiefs 
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of Internal Audit Services of the UN System expressed regret that two provisions of IAS 1 
had not been included in the ‘inter-organizational accounting and financial reporting 
standard’. More specifically, the individual commented that “wrong or inappropriate 
treatment of items in balance sheets, income statements or profit and loss accounts, or 
other statements, is not rectified either by disclosure of accounting policies or by notes or 
explanatory material”, and that comparative figures were also not included in the financial 
statements (UN, 1982, paras.13 and 14).   
 
As a result, renewed discussion on the overall accountability and transparency of the UN 
System’s activities started to resurface. Despite the acceptance of international accounting 
principles underpinning the institution’s development of a financial reporting system, the 
UN System continued to suffer from issues of legitimacy over its choice to retain control 
through internally developed accounting standards. This was exacerbated by a perceived 
lack of transparency from the outturns of the financial reports. For example, Hazzard’s 
(1989) investigative journalism piece published in The New Yorker highlighted the 
difficulties faced by external stakeholders interested in tracking UN finances and 
spending. Outsiders were not the only ones who noticed this, as even within the UN 
System, these deficiencies were a source of some internal concern. 
 
The former UN Under-Secretary-General for Management (Patricio Ruedas) was quoted in 
1985 as saying that “Member States have … stressed the need to be told, more clearly 
and more extensively … what has been the programmatic performance of the Secretariat, 
which outputs have been delivered, and with which result … Let us strengthen the 
monitoring and evaluation functions … I find the essential problem one of better and 
more transparent information, thus permitting better decisions” (JIU, 1993, p.5). In other 
words, an argument was made linking the need for improved accountability and decision-
making with accounting reforms. Despite the concerns raised, the UN System persisted 
with the use of the ‘inter-organizational accounting and financial reporting standard’ for 
nearly a decade, relying on its constitutional right to authorise (legitimise) its own 
standards, fending off both internal critique of the standards and practices used as well as 
the external pressure for further accounting reform.  
 
5.2 Trials of strength: De-legitimising internally developed systems  
However, the UN System’s steadfastness did not alleviate the calls for change and 
attempts to de-legitimise its internal adaptation of international standards. In 1991, a 
proposal from the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the Specialized 
Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (from hereon referred to as the 
Panel; these are the auditor generals from various national jurisdictions responsible for 
co-ordinating the audits which the members are responsible for and as a forum to 
exchange best practice) to develop common codified accounting standards specific for 
the UN System was brought to the General Assembly. Although the proposal had many 
dissenting internal voices, it was agreed that any change had to take into consideration 
the institutional specificities of the UN System as well as other recognised standards, 
including those of the IASC (UN, 1991a). For instance, the auditors argued that the aims 
and objectives of UN System organisations, disclosure requirements and users are in 
many respects fundamentally different from those more relevant to commercial entities 
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(UN, 1991b). These arguments highlighted the combined used of multiple discursive 
strategies as the UN System asserted its moral right to self-determine and self-police its 
own accounting standards while also relying on the expertise of the IASC to justify its 
choice of accounting standards (normalisation).  
 
The UN System’s use of moralising and normalising strategies to sustain the legitimacy of 
its policy on accounting standards was however countered by de-legitimising actions from 
the auditor (i.e., the Panel). As a result of sustained pressure from the Panel, the Working 
Party on Accounting Standards (UN, 1991a, paras.34-39) was established in the same year 
to develop more relevant standards for the UN System and to reduce reliance on 
accounting standards designed primarily for capital markets. The Panel’s approach to de-
legitimise existing UN accounting practice relied on reframing the normalising and 
moralising arguments used. For instance, the original adaptation of standards was 
deemed to be insufficient as the strategy of relying on IASC/IASB standards was seen to 
be inappropriate for an IO such as the UN System with its unique remits. The Panel 
eventually prevailed in this battle of wills, culminating in the establishment of a jointly 
developed (with the Panel) new internal standard, the UNSAS (UN, 2007). UNSAS is based 
on modified cash accounting (UN, 1993), which is in contrast with accruals-based 
standards as promulgated by the IASC. Another aspect of particular note here is that the 
use of UNSAS represented a major step towards the adoption of common language and 
terminology among accountants of UN System organisations.  
 
Although UNSAS has, since its establishment, been subjected to a series of revisions to 
improve its design, the revised system has still not managed to quell periodic criticisms 
over its inability to bridge the accountability deficit. This was attributed to the flexible 
nature of its design which was meant to allow it to cope with the heterogeneous needs of 
UN System organisations, but which resulted in deficiencies. For instance, from an audit 
perspective, UNSAS operates with a conflict of interest, since the Panel is responsible for 
both auditing and standard-setting, an issue compounded by its role in the development 
of UNSAS. From an accountability viewpoint, UNSAS allows reporting organisations to 
ignore fundamental accounting conventions if they are deemed inappropriate for their 
specific circumstances. Given the highly politicised and complex nature of UN operations, 
UNSAS was seen to permit too much leeway for interpretation, especially since the 
foundation of the standard defers to reporting bodies’ the freedom to assert their 
autonomy over financial matters. This inevitably enables the reporting organisation, if it so 
chooses, to dispense with strict discipline and censure.   
 
As a result of the inconsistent application of standards under UNSAS, further calls for 
reform were made. The limitations of UNSAS were becoming increasingly apparent and 
new proposals were put forward to adopt a revised IAS as its replacement (UN, 1997a; 
1997b). The following issues were raised as being particularly problematic (ibid.), thus 
helping to strengthen the rationale for further accounting reform: 
i. disclosure of the valuation of liabilities arising from termination benefits; 
ii. disclosure of non-expendable property in a more uniform way; 
iii. the scope and nature of the cash flow statement; 
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iv. the need to establish clear accounting standards for the United Nations Joint 
Staff Pension Fund and for adequate pension disclosure by participating 
organisations; 
v. the need for uniform application of the existing standards relating to the 
provision for delays in collecting assessed contributions; and 
vi. the disclosure and valuation of voluntary contributions-in-kind. 
In September 2001, the HLCM proposed (but did not authorise) a radically revised 
agenda to dispense with internally developed standards in favour of globally accepted 
accruals-based standards (UN, 2001) such as IPSAS. 
 
5.3 Tipping point: The decisive shift towards global standards  
While the UN System’s internal accounting steering groups and the Panel were 
increasingly vocal over UNSAS’ limitations, reluctance from organisations within the UN 
System meant that there was initially little support for such change. The tipping point 
came when the UN (as a standalone organisation, or UNO) itself was embroiled in its own 
financial malfeasance and this affected the balance of support for UNSAS within wider UN 
System. In the aftermath of the First Gulf War in 1995, the UN Security Council (UN, 1995) 
passed a resolution to allow Iraq to sell its oil in exchange for humanitarian supplies, 
primarily food and medicine, to alleviate the suffering of ordinary citizens in a crippled 
economy. The programme, which came to be known as oil-for-food was the largest 
humanitarian relief programme in world history (estimated to have delivered US$32 
billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment in exchange for Iraqi oil), but was 
terminated in 2003 after revelations of corruption involving misappropriated funds. As 
details of the scandal and subsequent political responses have been widely reported 
elsewhere (e.g., Katzman and Blanchard, 2005; Hsieh and Moretti, 2006; US Government 
Accountability Office or GAO, 2006), the focus here is on analysing the call to withdraw 
UNSAS and replace it with international accounting standards. 
 
It is intriguing that even before the oil-for-food scandal broke in 2003, the UN System had 
been criticised by IFAC (2001) for the lack of a common set of accounting standards 
across all of its system organisations. IFAC commented unfavourably on the UN System’s 
persistence with their internally developed accounting system, pointing out that “despite 
the importance of good quality financial reporting and accounting standards to 
improvements in governance, accountability and transparency, most of the UN’s system 
management reports (with the exception of the [WFP]) have not linked financial reporting 
or accounting standards to these three reform aims” (as reported in JIU, 2010, p.1). This 
assessment came as part of IFAC’s (2001) wider study on Governance in the Public Sector, 
which was in turn drawn from a (UK-based) Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) document promoting similar values and ideas on how governance 
can be improved through accounting-based systems of accountability (OPM and CIPFA, 
2004). In other words, these statements represented the use of intertwining strategies of 
normalisation (by appealing to the experience and expertise of IFAC and CIPFA), 
moralisation (vilifying the ‘failure’ of internally developed systems) and rationalisation 
(accountability failures can be resolved through the adoption of ‘better’ accounting 
systems) to de-legitimise the standing of UNSAS.  
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On 21 April 2004, the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with the endorsement of the 
UN Security Council and under pressure from the US Congress, appointed an 
independent high-level commission to investigate the oil-for-food programme scandal. 
The commission, led by former US Federal Reserve chairperson Paul Volcker, concluded 
that the failures of the programme demonstrated the great need for “fundamental and 
wide-ranging administrative reform” in the UNO (cited in Blanchfield, 2015, p.11). The 
commission recommended establishing an independent oversight board to review UNO 
auditing, accounting, and budgeting activities; creating the position of Chief Operating 
Officer to oversee administrative matters such as personnel and planning practices; 
providing fair compensation to third parties involved in UNO programmes (while ensuring 
that the compensation does not lead to inappropriate profit); and expanding financial 
disclosure requirements to cover a variety of UNO staff, including those working on 
procurement (Blanchfield, 2015; Alesani et al., 2012, p.68). The US government also 
made the payment of American financial arrears to the UN System conditional on these 
reforms (Bite, 2005). Following on from the Volcker Report, Christopher Burnham (a US 
citizen) was appointed in June 2005 as the UN Under-Secretary-General for Management, 
to reform the UNO in the name of transparency and accountability. US citizens also hold 
other key reform-related posts at the UNO, which a number of American politicians 
believe is needed to further the policy interests of the US (Blanchfield, 2008). The next 
section discusses US-led reforms to rebuild the UN System’s legitimacy through externally 
sourced financial reporting systems. 
 
 
6 RE-LEGITIMATION OF EXTERNALLY DEVELOPED SYSTEMS 
 
6.1 Rationalising the need for an externally developed accounting system 
The 2005 World Summit was the first opportunity where findings from the Volcker Report 
were extensively debated. During this summit, the Panel chair wrote to the president of 
the General Assembly recommending that the UN System “apply international accounting 
standards, policies and practices consistently in line with recognized good practices” (UN, 
2006d, para.9). The Task Force (UN, 2005c) subsequently concluded that UNSAS could 
“no longer be considered to meet the needs of modern financial reporting” (para.5) and 
recommended that the UN System adopt IPSAS by 2010 (para.25). As has been previously 
discussed, the use of such rationalisation on the need for global accounting standards is a 
recurring theme amongst promoters of accounting reforms. A deconstruction of the 
recommendation above reveals the utilisation of normalising (“applying international 
accounting standards”), rationalising (“in line with recognised”) and moralising (“good 
practices”) discursive strategies to legitimise the need for accounting change.  
 
Further, the use of normalising and rationalising arguments for change are 
epistemologically based, where expertise in IFRS and IPSAS is seen as evidence that the 
adoption of external standards is a feasible alternative to re-developing UNSAS or some 
other UN-specific standard. The UN accounting standards development project 
considered the “best available options for external standards adoption” (UN, 2005a, 
para.73). Professional service firms such as PwC were recruited to “provide support, 
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primarily in the form of on-going advice and assistance in managing the project and 
technical inputs” on IPSAS-related issues (JIU, 2010, para.116). However, PwC was not 
only linked with the development of IPSAS, but was also involved in the provision of 
expert commentary on the wider set of governance reforms, such as the oversight and 
audit mechanisms at the UN System (UN, 2006a, Annex I). For example, PwC’s role on the 
governance reforms meant that it could propose agenda items to the Steering Committee 
(UN, 2006f, para.15) as well as be present for all meetings in which deliberations were 
made and decisions were taken. The involvement of PwC as a consultant for public sector 
accounting and governance reforms is not just limited to the UN System case, but has 
important historical precedence elsewhere, as evidenced by its role in similarly assisting 
the Canadian government (Free et al., 2013, p.453). 
 
However, the involvement of such firms acting on their own as lead reformers do not 
bring with them the level of political legitimacy sought by institutions such as the UN 
System and major donor nations such as the US. The central feature of the rationalising 
and narrativising discursive strategies used to promote IPSAS at the UN System connects 
abstract and widely circulated ideas of accounting with problems that are locally situated. 
The proposed solutions are made up of logically constructed (but often not empirically 
tested or proven) arguments on how accounting change can remedy existing problems 
caused by accountability or management issues. In other words, IPSAS could have been 
sold on the self-evident principle that its application could resolve the deep-seated and 
complex multi-country political dynamic behind the global branding of the UN System. 
However, as Brunsson (2006, p.78) notes, it is impossible to deduce, a priori, from such 
rationalisations whether the principles (e.g., from which IPSAS is derived) map well with 
the principles that underpin existing organisational practices (e.g., at the UN System).   
 
Economic and/or political crises often present reformers with fleeting but authoritative 
legitimacy to reform systems through such experimentation with rationalisation. IFAC’s 
criticisms of the limitations of the then existing UN accounting standards, just before the 
oil-for-food scandal broke, help position IPSAS as a credible alternative to UNSAS. The 
scandal led reformers (such as the vocal but powerful minority at the HLCM and the Panel) 
to call for wider management reorganisation, which included accounting change within 
the UN System. This is notwithstanding the fact that the “oil-for-food scandal did not 
involve accounting irregularities and financial reporting was not initially viewed as relevant 
to the [IPSAS] reforms, despite their focus on governance, transparency and 
accountability” (Alesani et al., 2012, p.68).  
 
The discursive strategies used to advocate IPSAS were constituted from a number of 
arguments linking the generic to the specific (UN, 2006c, pp.33-34; UN, 2006d; JIU, 2010, 
paras.9-13), combining normalisation, rationalisation and moralisation. First was the 
recognition of the role that accountants and accounting play in improving the financial 
management of public services (JIU, 2010, para.9) as “IPSAS are credible, high-quality, 
independently produced accounting standards” (UN, 2006c, p.33).  
 
Second, financial statements produced should cater to both internal and external users by 
reporting on an accruals accounting basis (JIU, 2010, para.10), “which is necessary for 
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best practice financial management and results in improved internal control and 
transparency with respect to assets and liabilities” (UN, 2006c, p.33; UN, 2006d, para.14). 
This argument stresses the limitations of the oversight function administered through 
standardised financial reporting practices and such arguments echo previous calls for 
accounting reform to improve accountability mechanisms (Blanchfield, 2011).  
 
Third, financial statements should not privilege any one user but be “more 
understandable to a wider group of financial statement users” (UN, 2006c, p.33) or in “an 
equal manner by all users” (JIU, 2010, para.11). This extends the previous argument’s 
logic by implying that such equality can only be achieved through the development of a 
common set of accounting standards by an authoritative body with the requisite 
international reach.  
 
The fourth and final argument emphasised the importance of international standards as a 
benchmark for comparisons, where IPSAS “represent current best practice for 
international organizations” and “will improve the quality, consistency and comparability 
of United Nations financial reporting” (UN, 2006c, p.33; cf. UN, 2006d, para.8). A 
Federation of European Accountants or FEE (now known as Accountancy Europe) 
manifesto claims that the value in adopting these standards is best extracted by “persons 
who have a thorough knowledge of accounting theory and practice and be audited by 
persons who have a similar background” (JIU, 2010, para.13).  
 
International accounting bodies such as FEE and IFAC/IPSASB underpin the normative 
legitimacy of global accounting standards, thus providing such bodies with opportunities 
to shape and influence global agendas. Hopwood (1994, p.247) noted early on that FEE’s 
role as a public-spirited regulator masked its true position as a lobbyist for the accounting 
profession. More recent work by Christopher Humphrey and his colleagues traced similar 
efforts made by IFAC to influence the global accounting and auditing agenda (Humphrey 
et al., 2009; Humphrey and Loft, 2008; Loft et al., 2006).   
 
The implications of the discussions above suggested that a move towards an expert-
based system of accountability crafted and run by accounting professionals and auditors 
could produce the desired outcome of improved external accountability. The first and the 
fourth arguments utilised normalisation, appealing to existing (and accounting focused) 
expertise. The second argument claimed that the deficit of external accountability could 
be resolved (moralising the need to recompense the ‘victim(s)’ of previous accounting 
systems) if a new system is developed (rationalisation). The third argument recycled 
moralisation by appealing to fairness and the desire to prevent future victimisation. 
 
Biraud’s report also contained additional uses of moralisation (prevention of victimhood 
through fairness and transparency), stating that its key role is to “increase awareness 
among delegates and officials of the various secretariats, who mostly do not have a 
professional background in accounting … it is essential to make this very technical 
accounting reform as understandable as any other management reform so that Member 
States and officials alike may appreciate the benefits to be expected from the adoption of 
IPSAS” (JIU, 2010, para.4). Such arguments implied the necessity of moving towards a 
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system that relied on higher levels of expertise and complexity to resolve the limitations in 
extant systems of accounting. As Brunsson (2006, pp.75-84) remarked, as long as reforms 
appear to be seemingly logical and expert-led, the rationalisation itself becomes self-
evident to, and is embraced by, the adopter and requires no further justification or 
reflexive scepticism. 
 
6.2 Authorising the decision to adopt an externally developed accounting system 
Once the decision to proceed with accounting reforms at the UN System was made, the 
next (critical) task was to consider the various alternatives between competing 
international accounting standards. In 2001, the HLCM was aware of (the then emerging) 
IPSAS as a potentially suitable alternative replacement system (UN, 2001). In the following 
year, just before the oil-for-food scandal broke, the UN System indicated that it favoured 
IPSAS as a replacement system and was active in providing feedback to IFAC’s PSC on 
“particular issues affecting the United Nations system” (UN, 2002b, Annex V). It 
emphasised that these “should be fully and effectively represented to the IFAC and that 
how best to put in place a mechanism to monitor and participate in IPSAS development 
would be pursued with IFAC (sic)” (UN, 2002a, para.35; see also UN, 2002b, para.30). 
After the decision to move to an externally sourced accounting system was taken in 2006, 
four different options on which specific global standard to adopt were put forward to the 
Task Force (UN, 2006e), which is reproduced unabridged here: 
 
(1)  “Good national standards, such as those from promulgated by Australia and New 
Zealand [sic] 
(2) IFRS 
(3) IPSAS 
(4) Hierarchy of GAAPs, with one preferred external standard and several exemptions 
for situations specific to the UN” 
 
It is interesting to note that the choices presented above were all variants of an accruals 
accounting-based system, with no consideration of other approaches, such as those 
based on statistical reporting (e.g., the System of National Accounts or SNA, 2008). 
Despite the apparent similarities in the choices offered, there was a lack of unanimity and 
support from the Task Force for any of the options. As a result, it was decided to proceed 
on the basis of a vote. Voting is a commonplace mechanism used by experts to resolve 
conflicts or disagreements at an international level (Brunsson et al., 2012, p.619), because 
the mechanism legitimises the decision taken on the basis of democratic principles 
(moralisation). Biraud reported that twenty-eight UN System organisations were contacted 
to vote for their choice of standards (JIU, 2010, para.24). The outcome of the vote showed 
that IPSAS was chosen over IFRS by the slenderest of margins – eleven to ten votes, with 
the remainder of votes distributed amongst the other two alternatives. This outcome 
served to highlight the highly contingent nature of how crucial decisions across the UN 
System were made.   
 
In his analysis of the outcome, Biraud found that votes were almost equally split into what 
he coined the ‘practical school’ of thought favouring an IFRS-based approach (which is 
used by the UK government; Heald and Hodges, 2015), versus the ‘logic school’ [sic], 
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which favours IPSAS (JIU, 2010, para.24). The discursive distinction between practical 
versus logic schools by Biraud is interesting. The former denoted the choice of a tried and 
(empirically) tested system of accounting such as IFRS, based on normalising strategies of 
legitimation through the selection of familiar and established systems. The latter could be 
suggestive of an (unquestioning) acceptance of a legitimation strategy based on the 
‘logical’ deduction that IPSAS is useful because it is specifically tailored to meet the needs 
of the public sector (narrativisation), but also has the advantage that it is based on 
established private sector standards (rationalisation and normalisation). These arguments 
are reminiscent of Brunsson’s (2006, p.127) observations that it is not necessary to have 
real-world experiences in order to advocate the need for reform. The narrow margin by 
which IPSAS was selected over IFRS, and the earlier battles between the Task Force and 
Christopher Burnham, suggested that a sizable minority of accountant directors at the UN 
System remained unconvinced that IPSAS is the way forward to resolve what was 
essentially a managerial and administrative crisis. Nevertheless, the decision has already 
been made and the adoption of IPSAS continues apace at the UN System (Bergmann and 
Fuchs, 2017).  
 
 
7. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
The objective of this study was to analyse and understand the UN System’s adoption of 
IPSAS from a legitimacy perspective. This study contributes to the literature in a number 
of ways. First, it provides insight into the UN System’s decision-making processes that led 
to the adoption of IPSAS by examining the way in which discursive strategies were used to 
legitimise the need for accounting reforms within the institution. More specifically, the 
study demonstrates how various actors intertwined or recombined discursive strategies to 
legitimise, de-legitimise, or re-legitimise the adoption of externally developed accounting 
standards.  
 
Initial legitimation was acquired by adopting the IASC’s standards, but this was soon de-
legitimised by the Panel and others that wanted an internally developed system to deal 
with on-going perceptions that the UN System lacked accountability. The oil-for-food 
scandal reignited arguments on the need to adopt externally developed standards due to 
perceived conflicts of interest with internally developed systems. Various individuals, 
organisations and Member States vied to impose their own perspectives on how the UN 
System should reform its accounting and accountability processes. In combination with 
the role of happenstance, the complex inter- and intra-organisational dynamics described 
in this study have illuminated the manner in which the use of international accounting 
standards came to be re-legitimised. This finding is complementary to other studies in the 
parallel research arena examining the choice of accounting standards in the public sector 
(e.g., Christensen and Parker, 2010; Santis, Grossi and Bisogno, 2018). 
 
Second, this study improves the understanding of how IOs such as the UN System 
operate, focusing in this instance on an internal implementation of accounting change. 
For example, while the study of rhetorical strategies used to support accounting reforms 
in the public sector is rapidly expanding (e.g., Lapsley et al., 2009; Christensen and 
The UN System’s decision to adopt IPSAS 
 19 
Parker, 2010; Brusca et al., 2013; Hyndman et al., 2018), research in the related field of 
accounting change at IOs remains decidedly under-researched. This is despite the 
substantial implications arising from the UN’s adoption of IPSAS, conferring it the status of 
a (or perhaps ‘the’) global accounting standard for the public sector and other IOs. It was 
also observed in this study that decision-making at the UN System was very much driven 
by concerns over political legitimacy and the accompanying need to continually 
demonstrate accountability. For example, Blanchfield (2011) noted that the timing of the 
UN System’s calls for reforms of its accountability processes tended to be cyclical in 
frequency, with new proposals appearing every five to ten years. In general, the numerous 
calls for reform over the past three decades could be distilled down to three basic root 
causes: (1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of accountability at the UN Secretariat; (2) 
duplication and redundancy of UN mandates, missions, and/or programmes; as well as (3) 
evidence of fraud, waste, abuse and/or mismanagement of UN resources (Blanchfield, 
2011, p.1). These diagnoses principally identified key organisational failings at the UN 
System, rather than any congenital problems with its internal or external financial 
reporting functions. 
 
This led to the third contribution, which highlighted the role of accounting reforms as a 
discursive (myth-making) tool. This study has considered the way in which the use of 
discursive strategies for legitimation associated the need for improved accountability with 
the solution to adopt globally recognised accounting systems. For instance, reports on 
the UN System’s decisions (UN 2005b; 2005c; 2006b) made clear that IPSAS was being 
positioned as the panacea for organisational failings within the UN System, many of which 
emanated from the perceived lack of a robust system of (accounting-based) 
accountability. This was also emphasised in Biraud’s report, which speculated that “had 
IPSAS been applied [earlier], … there would have been no unpleasant surprises about the 
necessity and cost of the Capital Master Plan, the liabilities [on health insurance], or about 
millions of unaccounted assets [sic], especially in peacekeeping missions” (JIU, 2010, 
para.3; words parenthesis added for clarity). This veiled critique of the delay in adopting 
IPSAS exemplified the inherent logic that adopting globally recognised accounting 
systems could lead to improved accountability. In the Secretary-General’s report on 
reforms of financial management practices, only the benefits of IPSAS were discussed 
(UN, 2006d, para.15). The Advisory Committee had to specifically request a summary that 
included both advantages and disadvantages of adopting IPSAS (UN, 2006c, para.38 and 
Annex VI, p.3). These observations reinforced the standing of mythmaking (Vaara et al.’s 
(2006) ‘mythopoesis’), such as the ‘self-evident’ need for (Lapsley et al., 2009), and 
‘orthodoxy’ of (Everett et al., 2007) accounting reforms in the public sector. Such logic 
conflates accountability failures with accounting system failures.  
 
From a policy perspective, this study provides critical insight into the historically complex 
motives for accounting reforms at a large IO. It is important for policy makers to 
appreciate the situated nature of accounting reforms at the UN System. The legitimacy 
crisis stemming from the confluence of events (long-standing issues over accountability; 
oil-for-food and UNSAS’ loss of legitimacy; close voting on alternative standards; the 
emergence of IPSAS) presented reformers with an opportunity to effect change, 
regardless of whether the proposed change would actually resolve the intrinsic problems 
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they wanted to redress. In reality the core issues lay with those vested with decision-
making powers, and improved financial reporting does not necessarily lead to improved 
decision-making transparency, as evidenced by Moloney and Stoycheva’s (2018) study on 
budgetary disclosures in IOs. Politicians and senior government decision makers need to 
resist calls for a quick response to a crisis of legitimation to ensure that the problem(s) is 
correctly identified before a solution(s) in the form of a major accounting change is 
applied as a remedy. Nevertheless, the adoption of an externally oriented system such as 
IPSAS may at least resolve one key issue inherent in the previous system (UNSAS) by 
improving data comparability across the vast UN System of organisations. Additionally, 
Bergmann and Fuchs (2017) have suggested that financial reporting on an IPSAS basis 
could also bring about greater transparency by triggering important debates over 
resource dependency.  
 
As with all studies that rely solely on the analyses of publicly accessible documents, there 
are research limits impacting the interpretation of decisions taken. This study was 
accordingly unable to consider the influence of strategic manoeuvres by key individuals 
and organisations that occurred behind the scenes, but which could involve motives other 
than legitimacy*. Future studies could extend the current analysis by taking into 
consideration the ways in which individual organisations within the UN System have, in 
their own manner, learned from their own experiences and those of others. There is also 
an ongoing need to critically evaluate whether IPSAS adoption substantially improves 
transparency and accountability across the UN System. The contrast between the WFP’s 
rapid and successful implementation of IPSAS and the UNO’s slower and more awkward 
adoption process* suggests that further empirical studies are needed to understand the 
role of specific organisational cultures and/or structures in enabling or resisting 
accounting change at IOs. 
 
*The authors would like to thank a reviewer for suggesting these points. 
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CRS Congressional Research Service (USA) 
EPSAS European Public Sector Accounting Standards 
FEE Accountancy Europe (formerly Federation of European Accountants) 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GAO Government Accountability Office (USA) 
HLCM High Level Committee on Management 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IASB  International Accounting Standards Board 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
IFAC International Federation of Accountants 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IO / IOs International Organisation(s) 
IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
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IPSASB International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board 
JIU Joint Inspection Unit 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Panel Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
PSC IFAC’s Public Sector Committee (predecessor to IPSASB) 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
TNC Trans-national Corporations, also known as Multinational Corporations 
UK United Kingdom 
UN / UNO United Nations System / United Nations as a standalone organisation 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNSAS United Nations System of Accounts 
US / USA United States of America 
WFP World Food Programme 
WHO World Health Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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Table 1: Timeline of major events regarding UN system accounting reforms (1973 - 2008) 
 
Year 
 
Event 
1973 Proposal to harmonise accounting practices for the treatment of assets. 
1980 Establishment of a working party on the harmonisation of financial 
statements of the UN system. IASC recommendations to serve as guidelines 
for UN accounting. 
1981 • UN adopted several US GAAP standards 
• Disclosure of accounting policies made mandatory 
1991 • Panel of External Auditors commented that IAS inappropriate for UN  
• Proposal for common UN accounting standards 
• Accounting Standards Committee established 
1993 Launch of UN System Accounting Standards (UNSAS). 
2002 A new Task Force on (internal) accounting standards for the UN system was 
set up. Note that this task force has a different remit to the task force of the 
1977 Working Group, which is primarily focused on external financial 
reporting standards. 
2003-
2004 
Accountability crisis following oil-for-food programme terminated de jure. 
Major review of governance structures and systems of accountability. 
Accounting and financial reporting was one of the issues raised in the 
reform agenda. 
2005 Launch of study to review UNSAS and to consider alternative accounting 
systems. 
2005 The Task Force on Accounting Standards (in 2002) recommended the 
adoption of IPSAS, which was subsequently accepted by the HLCM in 
November 2005.  
2006 In April 2006, the CEB endorsed the HLCM recommendation that all the 
United Nations system organisations adopt IPSAS. Following this, the 
Secretary-General sought United Nations approval for IPSAS to be adopted 
system-wide. 
2006 On 7 July 2006, General Assembly resolution 60/283 approved the 
adoption of IPSAS for the United Nations. 
2006-
2008 
The World Food Programme (WFP) was the first UN system organisation to 
implement IPSAS, effective from January 2008. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between key decision making committees at the UN and key 
organisations within the wider UN system.  
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Note: The Trusteeship Council suspended its operation in 1994 after Palau became 
independent (UN, 2017). For a full list of UN system organisations, see the UN Systems Chart 
(UN, 2017). Most of the UN system organisations have adopted IPSAS, but some notable 
exceptions include the World Bank and the IMF (see Bergmann and Fuchs, 2017, Table 2). 
